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LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO
HAZARDOUS WASTE: CATCH-22 MEETS
THE FOX GUARDING THE
CHICKEN COOP
Steven J. Castleman*
I. INTRODUCTION
I never imagined that my career as an Assistant District Attorney
would call to mind Joseph Heller's Catch-22, where you had to be crazy
to get out of the Army, but wanting out was conclusive evidence of san-
ity. However, during the last three years, as San Francisco's chief envi-
ronmental prosecutor, I have confronted the sad fact that local
government's response to the hazardous waste crisis presents just such a
dilemma. You have heard of the fox guarding the chicken coop? I'm the
fox's lawyer. I am also the one assigned to count the eggs. Catch-22.
My first hazardous waste prosecution involved a man who was stor-
ing 1000 containers of suspected hazardous waste on Pier 70, over San
Francisco Bay, in February, 1983. Experts said that the wastes identi-
fied-PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls), pesticides, arsenic compounds,
cyanides, and concentrated acids--could have caused a major environ-
mental catastrophe had they caught fire or leaked into the Bay. The de-
fendant was the first to be convicted for a hazardous waste crime by a
California jury.1 Filing the complaint was easy. Prosecuting it was not.
Like most district attorneys, I have no background in chemistry or toxi-
cology. Nor was I familiar with the Hazardous Waste Control Act,2 a
complex and untested law. During the eight months it took to litigate
the case, I had to learn both the law and the science involved. It was
quite an education.
This case also marked by first exposure to government's role as a
major part of the hazardous waste problem. The Port of San Francisco
* Assistant District Attorney and Chief, Consumer and Envtl. Protection Unit, City &
County of San Francisco. B.A. 1975, Yale University; J.D. 1980, University of San Francisco.
1. People v. Wilson, No. 585-309 (San Francisco Muni. Ct. of Cal. Dec. 3, 1983), aff'd,
No. CR3306 (San Francisco Super. Ct. of Cal. Apr. 19, 1985). The superior court certified this
decision to the California Court of Appeal on its own motion in April, 1985. As of the time of
publication, the court of appeal had yet to grant or deny a hearing.
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25245 (West 1984).
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had permitted the illegal storage site to exist for well over a year. As the
case progressed, I began to realize that the Port had little control over or
knowledge of the activities of its tenants who handled hazardous
materials.
In the wake of the Pier 70 case, I became aware of many other haz-
ardous materials problems caused either by City agencies or by tenants of
the City. Department of Public Works crews routinely dumped diesel
fuel down storm drains. City crews used out-of-date propane cylinders
which were illegal to refill. Electricians handled PCB-cooled capacitors
without adequate training or protective equipment.
I was not alone in discovering these problems. Defense attorneys
often commented that the City was a more frequent and extreme violator
than their clients. In addition, a small group of City employees who
were familiar with environmental regulation also became aware of some
of the violations.3 But despite our collective efforts to make City officials
aware, they failed to realize that there was a problem until it became a
crisis.
The crisis erupted when an illegal hazardous waste dump used for
years by the City's Municipal Railway (MUNI) was discovered right
next to one of the City's largest drinking water reservoirs.4 When this
PCB-contaminated dump was discovered, the City could no longer ig-
nore its part in the hazardous waste problem.
As a result, I conducted a six-week investigation of the City's haz-
ardous waste practices, which uncovered a pervasive pattern of violations
indicative of decades of environmental neglect and wholesale lack of ac-
countability within City government for hazardous waste decision-mak-
ing. On August 26, 1985, the District Attorney's office released a report
accusing the City of violating California's hazardous waste laws on virtu-
ally every day since those laws had become effective.5 The violations
included:
1. Illegal disposal of PCBs and other hazardous wastes at an
illegal dump for several years;
2. Illegal transportation of hazardous waste from one city-
owned site to another;
3. These employees included a Public Utilities Commission Safety Officer, Health De-
partment Environmental Bureau officials, the San Francisco Fire Department's Hazardous
Materials Program Coordinator and various personnel of the City's Risk Management Office.
4. Popularly referred to as the University Mound site, this dump was located at the cor-
ner of Bowdoin and University Streets in downtown San Francisco.
5. S. Castleman, Investigation of University Mound and City Agencies Re: Hazardous
Waste Violations (Aug. 26, 1985) (unpublished memorandum to elected District Attorney
Arlo Smith) (released to San Francisco's mayor and board of supervisors).
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3. Illegal storage of hazardous waste-including PCBs, sol-
vents, asbestos, pesticides, insecticides, waste paints and labora-
tory waste-every day for years;
4. Storage of hazardous wastes, including PCBs, in areas
which were unsecured and accessible to anyone who happened
by; and
5. Failure to educate workers who handle hazardous materi-
als and wastes about the dangers of these materials; and, a fail-
ure to train these employees in proper precautions and the use
of protective equipment.6
Since the release of the report, I have been advising the City as it
struggles to comply with environmental regulations. As prosecutors
rarely see the defendant's point of view, this has been an eye-opening
experience for me, one that has brought me face to face with the incredi-
ble array of problems faced by the regulated community in complying
with these laws.
Local government faces two major problems in responding to the
hazardous waste challenge. It is placed in the curious and contradictory
position of being at the same time the enforcer of environmental laws and
a significant violator of those laws. While some City agencies were vio-
lating hazardous materials laws, others were entrusted with enforcing
them. In addition to the District Attorney's office, several other city
agencies are responsible for enforcing hazardous materials and waste
law. For example, the San Francisco Fire Department's Hazardous
Materials Permitting Program7 requires users of hazardous materials to
obtain permits for what they use and store.' The program also regulates
underground storage tanks and provides for public disclosure of hazard-
ous materials that are stored by businesses. 9 Significantly, City depart-
ments, including the fifty-one sites used by the Fire Department itself,
are also required to obtain these permits.10 Thus, the Fire Department is
in the contradictory position of being both the enforcer of hazardous ma-
terial regulations and a potential violator, as well.
Similarly, the Environmental Health Bureau of the San Francisco
Department of Public Health investigates hazardous waste complaints.1
6. Id.
7. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. FIRE CODE art. 29 (1983).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. The Environmental Health Bureau conducts these investigations pursuant to its gen-
eral power to respond to public health inquiries. See generally SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.
HEALTH CODE (1983).
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In addition to its traditional public health activities, the Health Depart-
ment also plans to expand its role in hazardous waste regulation through
a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) with the State Toxic Sub-
stances Control Division. Under the MOU the local Health Department
would inspect all generators of hazardous waste in San Francisco. How-
ever, the Health Department is also a generator of hazardous waste since
its laboratories and clinics use large quantities of dangerous chemicals.
Thus, it is subject to the very regulation it has proposed to enforce.
Hazardous materials violations are not the only examples of the
"fox guarding the chicken coop." The District Attorney's investigation
revealed that the City government is a long-time violator of the entire
spectrum of environmental laws, while offices within that government are
entrusted with enforcing those laws against private industry. All levels
of government-local, state and federal-have a bad reputation for envi-
ronmental compliance. As a result, San Francisco's situation is not at all
unique. Many, if not most, local governments face similar problems.
In addition to all the environment compliance problems it shares
with private industry, government faces a second layer of problems in its
role as an environmental enforcer. Solving these problems promises to be
a long, difficult, expensive proposition. This Article examines the causes,
and suggests some approaches to solving these pressing problems.
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE AS ENFORCER
The most important problem for local government as an enforcer of
environmental law is the trend toward decentralization, characterized by
increasing delegation of enforcement authority to the local level.
This trend flows from a common-sense recognition that local envi-
ronmental problems can best be solved locally. Clean-up of contami-
nated sites is a perfect example. Those directly affected by abandoned
waste sites are often frustrated with clean-ups directed by state or federal
bureaucracies. They complain that clean-up vigor is directly proportion-
ate to the site's distance from the homes of those responsible for cleaning
it up. The more centralized the governmental bureaucracy, the more
sites it handles, and the less likely it is that any individual site will stand
out. This is particularly true of the vast majority of abandoned sites less
notorious than Love Canal, Times Beach or Stringfellow Acid Pits.
These less notorious sites are likely to sit unaddressed for a long time
before centralized state or federal authorities have the resources to attend
to them. "Superfund" programs"2 have relatively limited resources com-
12. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
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pared to the large number of sites that need attention and the enormous
costs involved. Thus, lower priority sites cannot be cleaned up in the
near future under these federal or state programs. No wonder that com-
munities affected by abandoned waste sites complain that state or federal
officials are insensitive to their concerns.
In contrast, local officials-particularly elected officials-cannot ig-
nore their constituents' fears when a hazardous materials incident oc-
curs. This supports the theory that as much enforcement activity as
possible should be handled by local authorities sensitive to local impacts.
Basic hazardous waste law recognizes the logic of decentralization.
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),' 3 which estab-
lished a national program for hazardous waste regulation, explicitly pro-
vides for decentralization.14 In so providing, Congress recognized that
the federal government could not regulate hazardous waste generation,
storage, transportation and disposal alone. Instead, RCRA delegated re-
sponsibility for enforcement of major portions of the hazardous waste
program to state governments.' 5 With this delegation, Congress con-
ceded that regulation could be more comprehensive and better attuned to
local problems faced by the communities directly affected.
Under RCRA, to the extent that state programs are as strict as the
federal program, they may be authorized to supplant the federal pro-
gram. 6 California is one state which has taken up the RCRA challenge,
has received interim authorization from EPA, and operates its program
in lieu of the federal program.
In a manner analogous to Congress' authorization of state programs
under RCRA, California has recognized the advisability of delegating
many hazardous materials responsibilities to county governments. The
result is the MOU program. The state delegates to counties which enter
into MOUs the authority to inspect and permit hazardous waste genera-
tors. Ideally, this delegation of authority increases the number of inspec-
tors and provides significantly more "eyes and ears" to look for potential
violations.
Hazardous waste regulation is not the only example of this decen-
tralization trend. In California, hazardous materials regulation has gone
§§ 9601-9657 (1982); Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25395 (West 1984).
13. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982).
14. Id. §§ 6926, 6941.
15. Id. §§ 6941-6949.
16. Id. § 6929.
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through a similar process. In 1983, the legislature passed the Sher Bill, 7
which set the stage for local hazardous materials programs, such as the
one operated by the San Francisco Fire Department."8 The Bill allows
local governments to regulate the use and storage of hazardous materials
if local ordinances were in place by the end of 1983. I9 Only in the juris-
dictions without such local ordinances does the state remain the regula-
tory authority. Many local governments passed such ordinances and
have assumed the regulatory responsibility from the state.20
California has also embarked on a state-wide program to regulate
underground storage tanks; the program places significant regulatory re-
sponsibility on local governments. Cities and counties are now responsi-
ble for registering underground storage tanks, permitting them, and
approving monitoring systems to identify leaks.2 They also review ap-
plications for removal or for abandonment-in-place of decomissioned un-
derground tanks.
Further evidence of the trend toward decentralization may be found
in California Assembly Bill 2185,22 which was enacted and became effec-
tive on January 1, 1986. A.B. 2185 requires that every business which
uses and stores hazardous materials to draft "business emergency plans"
for response to accidental chemical emergencies. Local governments
must collect the emergency plans and synthesize them into a comprehen-
sive plan for emergency response to chemical incidents.
The foregoing examples clearly illustrate that regulation of environ-
mental matters, once a federal concern, has been extensively delegated to
state and local authorities. As a result of this trend, local governments
are increasingly burdened with the responsibility for enforcing environ-
mental regulations.
III. LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE AS A VIOLATOR OF THE LAW
Increasing enforcement responsibility also highlights local govern-
ment's role as a violator of the law and increases the urgency of cor-
recting widespread internal compliance failures.
Those who have watched government in action often think that gov-
17. Cal. A.B. 1362, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., ch. 1362, 1983 (codified as amended at CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25280-25289 (West Supp. 1986)); see also CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 23, RR. 2610-2621 (1983).
18. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
19. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25299.1 (West 1984).
20. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. FIRE CODE art. 29 (1983).
21. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25299.1 (West 1984).
22. Cal. A.B. 2185, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. (1985).
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ernmental agencies believe they are either exempt from the law or simply
above it.
Sometimes this is just an attitude that permeates the bureaucracy.
Other times it is a fact. For example, the San Francisco Fire Department
has long regulated storage of gasoline and other flammable or corrosive
hazardous materials.23 However, the Fire Department has never in-
cluded City agencies as part of the regulated community. Consequently,
improper practices of City agencies are not routinely discovered by the
regulatory agency.
In addition, it is difficult, if not impossible, for one governmental
agency to effectively enforce its regulations against other governmental
agencies, even though everyone agrees that the regulations are applicable
to private industry. This is the case not only in San Francisco. At the
federal level, by presidential order, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) cannot take formal action to enforce its regulations
against other federal agencies. Rather, EPA is required to work out any
such problems it encounters informally.24
Even where there is no explicit exemption for governmental agen-
cies, many governmental employees do not take compliance seriously.
Why? There are several reasons. First, there is a lack of individual ac-
countability within governmental bureaucracies.
Second, government employees do not feel the same threat of prose-
cution for violations that private industry feels. Government employees
often do not believe that they will be personally liable for fines that might
be levied against the agencies for which they work. The same holds true
in the case of criminal penalties. Employees simply do not believe they
will be prosecuted individually; therefore, the threat of prosecution is not
real to them.
Finally, if prosecution is not a threat to individuals, it is even less of
a threat to the bureaucracy as a whole. There is no way to put a govern-
ment agency in jail. Even if an agency were fined, no individual would
suffer financially. Does it make sense for one government agency to pay
fines to another? In many cases, any fines would be merely an account-
ing adjustment among agencies. Even if fines are assessed, ultimately
taxpayers and not the employees would pay.
23. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. FIRE CODE arts. 11, 13 (1983).
24. Exec. Order No. 12,088, 43 Fed. Reg. 47,707 (1978), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321
note (West Supp. 1985).
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IV. PROBLEMS COMMON TO BOTH ENFORCEMENT
AND COMPLIANCE
Although there are problems unique to each of government's sepa-
rate roles, most problems are common to both and significantly hamper
government's ability to do a competent job as either regulator or
regulatee.
One substantial problem has been local government's tardiness in
recognizing hazardous waste as a serious problem for which it has major
responsibilities. The lack of a credible threat of prosecution has en-
couraged this neglect.
In addition, government does not perceive itself as a member of the
regulated community. Though government often reaches out to regu-
lated communities to provide guidance on new regulations, it does not do
the same for itself. Managers of San Francisco departments which use
hazardous materials and generate hazardous waste have never been
trained in the legal and technical requirements of the law. Where man-
agers are completely ignorant of the law, how can they comply with it?
Furthermore, government is primarily reactive. Crisis, and only cri-
sis, prompts action. Government lacks foresight about environmental
problems and has not realized that it may play a larger part contributing
to the problem than it does solving it.
Local government's recognition that it has a problem is a big step.
It is also the easiest step. Getting government to change business as
usual is infinitely harder.
The same problems that caused government to ignore environmen-
tal compliance for so long also inhibit its ability to rectify the situation.
The complexity of the legal and scientific issues involved in hazardous
waste regulations necessitates a tremendous amount of education for
those who must either enforce the law or comply with it. It took me
many months to learn the law and the science in order to prosecute viola-
tors. Every level of the bureaucracy must go through the same process to
insure internal compliance.
Further, while government managers face the same educational
problems as prosecutors, they face them on a much larger scale. A pros-
ecutor's office might need to train several people in the legal and techni-
cal issues. A City has to train thousands. It may cost thousands of
dollars to prosecute a case, but City-wide compliance will cost millions.
Another problem is the diffuse nature of responsibility within gov-
ernment. In San Francisco, we found that there was no single individual
with overall responsibility for ensuring the City's environmental compli-
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ance. Within individual departments there were no managers specifically
charged with that responsibility either. And, even when people within
specific departments were responsible for small areas of environmental
concern, they were isolated from all other departments which might face
similar problems. Their efforts would not be of City-wide benefit. Each
department had to "reinvent the wheel" internally if it wanted to take
steps toward compliance.
Fragmentation of responsibility further complicates all solutions.
Although City-wide training relating to environmental compliance is es-
sential, there is no mechanism within city government capable of provid-
ing it. No structure accommodates the training needs of all of the
departments at once. That structure remains to be developed. Thus,
even the most preliminary efforts at solutions face serious obstacles
which may have little to do with environmental issues.
This problem is exacerbated by the highly technical nature of haz-
ardous materials regulation. Department managers are generally unfa-
miliar with the chemistry, toxicology and biology that is necessary to
understand the regulations. In areas which involve issues of scientific
uncertainty, such as cancer causation and other controversial toxicologi-
cal issues, managers of local governmental agencies are wholly unquali-
fied to make informed judgements. A steep learning curve awaits them.
Only after extensive training will they understand the full impact of-let
alone make intelligent decisions about-the problems they face.
Perhaps the most troubling element here is the process of govern-
ment itself. By its very nature government is a slow-moving beast.
Although private business can change policies and procedures and divert
financial resources relatively quickly, government cannot. Governmental
decision-making is fragmented and democratic, and therefore it is slow
and inflexible. Before budgetary decisions can be made, hearings must be
held, compromises must be reached, and political consensus must gel-
all of which takes time.
Moreover, every level-departmental management, budget bureau-
cracy and elected officials-has input into the ultimate decision. And
every decision-making level has all of the problems described above: a
lack of legal and technical understanding; a steep learning curve to climb;
and a snail's-pace process. The re-education process which must be re-
peated at every level further slows decision-making at every step. And-
because top management typically must face numerous crises at any
given time-the higher up one is in the chain of command, the less time
one has to devote to any educational process, and the less complete is
one's understanding of complex issues. Thus, the more important the
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decision, the less likely it is that the person making it fully grasps the
impact and seriousness of the decisions' consequences.
Finally, there is the issue that never goes away-money. Staff, train-
ing, equipment, supplies and everything else costs a geal deal. And just
as the democratic process guarantees delay, lack of funds often guaran-
tees the failure of local environmental enforcement and compliance
programs.
Local governments have borne the brunt of budget cuts both on na-
tional and statewide levels. States like California have suffered "tax
revolts," such as Proposition 13,25 which have limited the ability of local
governments to raise revenues.
Even those only peripherally familiar with the subject are aware of
the tremendous expense involved in solving hazardous waste problems.
Literally millions of dollars are spent decontaminating hazardous waste
sites.26 The problems of waste disposal, drinking water contamination,
air contamination and the human health consequences of exposure to
toxic substances defy quick or easy solutions. Further, they defy inex-
pensive solutions.
At the same time that local governments have been handed a vast
new set of environmental regulations to enforce, federal and state fund-
ing has been increasingly cut. When new areas of regulation are dele-
gated to local governments there is no commensurate delegation of
resources. Though legislators may perceive a need for new regulation,
they cannot anticipate all implementation problems, or costs. As a re-
sult, legislators have failed to fund local governments adequately to in-
sure the success of realistic programs.
The State of California does not fund local health departments
which enter into Memoranda of Understanding. Although the State of-
fers to help train health inspectors, it does not yet fund counties in devel-
oping environmental regulatory programs. Although local governments
have been made responsible for regulating the use and storage of hazard-
ous materials, for the continued use and monitoring of underground stor-
age tanks, and for responding to chemical emergencies, the State has not
provided any corresponding resources to accomplish these tasks. Nor
does the State seem likely to do so in the near future.
Consequently, the financial burden for enforcing hazardous material
and waste regulation falls to local government, a level which has been
25. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A (enacting Proposition 13).
26. Just one decontamination-that following the PCB transformer explosion at One Mar-
ket Plaza in San Francisco in March 1983-reportedly cost in excess of $25 million. S.F.
Examiner, Jan. 10, 1984, at A2, col. 3.
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already hard hit by federal and state budget cuts, and is in danger of even
greater cuts in response to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings budget
mandate.
27
In this climate, and given the officials' general lack of understanding
of hazardous waste issues, budget requests associated with new environ-
mental enforcement or compliance programs receive a chilly reception.
Without an adequate understanding of the enormity of the problem, offi-
cials are tempted to believe that existing personnel and budgets can ab-
sorb new environmental programs with little additional financial
commitment.
This is a crippling misconception. Local governments must recog-
nize that protecting their workers and their communities from hazardous
materials means a fundamental restructuring of the way government
does business. It is a costly process. In the final analysis, local govern-
ment must be forced to realize that preventive action now, no matter how
costly, will save money in the long run-to say nothing of protecting the
environment and public health and safety.
Unless this Catch-22 between increased responsibility for enforce-
ment and inadequate resources is reversed, compliance efforts are
doomed to failure.
V. SOLUTIONS
Although the problems cannot be underestimated, there are solu-
tions. The first essential task is to identify hazardous materials regula-
tion as a problem that requires significant attention by top management
in local government. Few local governments can avoid the issue much
longer. Departments of virtually every local government use hazardous
materials, including paints, solvents, asbestos, petroleum products,
PCBs, pesticides, insecticides, herbicides and other toxic chemicals.
Once the problems have been identified, coming to grips with solu-
tions will involve:
1. Training. Immediate training of all levels of responsibility,
from manual laborers to top management, must proceed on an emer-
gency basis. Workers who handle hazardous materials must be educated
about proper handling procedures, use of protective equipment, health
risks associated with exposure, and emergency procedures and responsi-
bilities. Top management, particularly elected officials, must develop an
adequate understanding of these problems and their solutions to make
27. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1038.
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realistic funding decisions. They must also understand the environmen-
tal, legal and financial risks associated with continued violations of the
law.
2. Centralization of Responsibility. Unless responsibility for insur-
ing internal compliance with environmental regulation is centralized,
there will always be the temptation to believe that it is "someone else's
problem." Centralization is also crucially important for emergency re-
sponse. A clear delineation of responsibilities avoids delay and duplica-
tion of effort.
There are several reasons why a centralized authority should not be
a part of an existing governmental agency, such as a health department.
First, as has been explained above, it makes little sense for the agency
responsible for compliance to be an agency which is also a probable
violator.
Second, compliance officers should be separated from the internal
pressures within departments, particularly budgetary pressures. How
can a compliance officer tell his or her bosses what to do or insist on
changes in practice and procedure? There is always tension between
managers, whose primary goal is production, and compliance officers,
whose primary goal is safety. Unless compliance officers are independ-
ent, they lack the authority to resist departmental pressure to "go slow"
or cover up dangerous practices.
Third, an independent compliance officer is not saddled with the
"history" of an existing department. This is important in combatting the
mistaken belief that existing staff and resources can absorb major new
functions of environmental compliance. In San Francisco, the Health
Department has been appointed the lead agency in ensuring compliance.
However, since it is the largest City department, many officials have ex-
pressed the view that there must be room within the Department's cur-
rent budget to implement these new programs without significant
additional staffing or resources. This is a dangerous and inaccurate per-
ception. New environmental compliance and enforcement programs are
major undertakings, requiring literally thousands of person-hours of
work-work which cannot be absorbed within existing budgets. If not
adequately and separately funded, these programs are destined to fail.
Finally, if a compliance officer is established as a new unit, directly
accountable to a mayor or county executive, it would provide the pro-
gram with the political clout to make significant short- and long-range
changes in government operations.
3. Short Range Tasks.
(1) A newly established compliance office must meet several
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short-term goals before the necessary long-term changes can be
accomplished.
(2) Among other tasks, the office must:
(a) Identify all sites which handle hazardous materials
or generate and store hazardous waste;
(b) Appoint a coordinator for each site to be responsible
for assuring proper compliance and to identify a small
group of people who should be given the most extensive
training; also, appoint an overall coordinator to supervise
all site coordinators;
(c) Inventory all hazardous wastes that are currently
stored;
(d) Pick-Up and Dispose of all wastes using a registered
waste hauler and a licensed disposal facility;
(e) Schedule ongoing disposal on a regular basis to com-
ply with the regulations limiting the time period within
which wastes may be stored at unlicensed sites (normally
90 days); and
(f) Prepare contingency plans for chemical accidents,
fires, earthquakes, etc. which could result in the release of
hazardous materials into the environment.
4. Long Range Tasks. Extensive planning must be undertaken to
determine changes in policy and practices necessary to insure efficient
steps toward compliance. Given the tremendous expense involved in
hazardous waste compliance, appropriate data must be developed to
guide long-range decision making. Perhaps the most important decision
concerns the feasibility of a single, centralized, licensed storage facility.
In order to determine whether this would be technically and financially
feasible, local government must determine exactly what hazardous
wastes are produced at what sites in what quantities over what period of
time. Most jurisdictions do not currently have this data. The specific
tasks that must be accomplished include:
(a) Inventory of all hazardous materials used at every site;
(b) Compilation of all Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) to
obtain information relating to proper handling procedures, pro-
tective equipment, associated risks and emergency response;
(c) Review of all MSDS's by a qualified industrial hygienist or
toxicologist to determine if there are less hazardous substitute
materials that can be used;
(d) Purchasing procedures that insure that only chemicals
that have undergone the above review can be bought;
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(e) Detailed Inspection of all sites that handle hazardous
materials or generate hazardous waste to determine their stor-
age conditions and assess what changes, including possible re-
construction, are necessary to comply with storage regulations;
and
(f) Synthesis of all data with the regulations so that a realistic
plan for reaching long-range compliance can be developed and
funded.
For long-range decision making, an invaluable tool is an "environ-
ment audit," in which qualified personnel review the MSDS information,
interview personnel on working procedures, inspect all facilities, compare
the existing situation with all applicable regulations and make detailed
compliance recommendations.
To accomplish this audit, a local government could hire outside con-
sultants qualified in the legal and technical requirements of the law or
hire additional personnel within the government who are similarly quali-
fied. Of course, both approaches have significant problems. Outside con-
sultants are expensive. And even, if outsiders are hired, the government
must still retain qualified inside personnel to oversee an expensive, com-
plicated and time-consuming audit, and then be able to evaluate its
results.
On the other hand, if new personnel are to be hired, the civil service
hiring process is certain to cause significant delay. In many instances
entirely new civil service classifications will be required, and funds will
have to be approved through the political process, further compromising
the ability to hire qualified personnel quickly.
The best approach is to hire both outside consultants and new gov-
ernmental employees. By doing so, a staff can be provided to oversee the
audit. Further, an audit conducted by external consultants can be used
as a training tool for governmental personnel. Finally, intelligent deci-
sions about appropriate long-term staffing needs cannot be made until an
audit provides the necessary data.
Whatever the mix of new personnel and outside consultants, the one
approach that should be avoided at all costs is to continue "business as
usual." An environmental compliance program must address not only
hazardous materials and waste compliance, but also Occupational Safety
and Health Act (OSHA),2" Worker29 and Community Right to Know
28. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982).
29. Hazardous Substance Information and Training (Worker Right to Know) Act, CAL.
LABOR CODE §§ 6360-6399.5 (West Supp. 1985).
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Acts,3 0 and a host of other regulations. Unless government realizes that
"business as usual" is no longer acceptable, it will continue to poorly
comply and enforce environmental laws. And, unless bureaucratic pro-
cedures can be short-circuited, these twin responsibilities cannot be met
within a reasonable time.
VI. CONCLUSION
Local government has not yet faced the two essential facts of its
hazardous waste responsibilities. The first is that local government is not
in a position to adequately enforce the law. The second fact is that local
government is not in a position to comply with the law, either.
Resources must be expanded to make the enforcement effort more
credible and to allow local governments to change their own practices
regarding hazardous materials and waste handling.
Although the authority for local enforcement exists, and although
local government is beginning to recognize the significant problems of
compliance, the resources that are necessary to address these issues have
not yet been committed. Comprehensive environmental programs will
require tens of millions of dollars. Furthermore, adequate resources will
not be available unless and until local government officials perceive that
there is a problem and act in a responsible manner to solve it. So far,
local government's conflicting roles as both enforcer and member of the
regulated community have contributed to the failure of competently fill-
ing either role.
But, it need not remain so. Rather than being a stumbling block,
government's dual role could be an asset in achieving reasonable regula-
tion which can be both environmentally sound and financially achieva-
ble. In its unique position as both an enforcer and a potential violator,
local government can gain invaluable insight into the problems faced by
private industry in satisfying the requirements of environmental law. It
can-indeed, it must-use this insight to great advantage in balancing
the conflicting priorities of safeguarding the environment with the techni-
cal and economic costs and consequences of these protections to the reg-
ulated community.
30. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. FIRE CODE art. 29 (1983).
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